Forced Labour in Xinjiang: Challenges and Legislative Responses

Note. Xinjiang region is the leading producer of cotton in China. From DJI-Agras, 2019. Pixabay

Introduction

The United States (US) has recently expanded the Entity List under the Uyghur Forced Labour Prevention Act (UFLPA), adding several Chinese companies subject to the import ban due to alleged ties to forced labour in Xinjiang (XUAR). This move comes amid growing concerns over the intensified exploitation of Uyghur and other minorities’ workforce, as reports continue to highlight worsening human rights conditions in the region.

Since at least 2014, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has tightened state control over Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other minority groups in XUAR, implementing a system of internment camps, mass surveillance, and coerced employment, with the claimed objectives of alleviating poverty and addressing extremism in Xinjiang. However, these policies have been under global scrutiny and, after years of allegations from non-governmental organisations and political entities, the United Nations found allegations of abuse, torture, and violence to be credible and called for a government investigation into human rights violations, including forced labour.

The American import ban reflects a broader international commitment to the elimination of forced labour from global value chains, also taking into account the recently passed European Union (EU) Forced Labour Regulation. Will these measures bring meaningful change to international trade and human rights?

Fighting terror or erasing identity?

Despite the difficulties in leading comprehensive research on the matter, several reports and advocacy groups have disclosed grave human rights violations in Xinjiang. Among these abuses is a state-imposed forced employment system that targets Uyghurs and other ethnic groups (Zenz & Lin, 2024). It is relevant to analyse these issues in the context of grievances present in the region and of the policies implemented by the Chinese government in the name of counter-terrorism, deradicalisation, and poverty alleviation.

The "Strike Hard Campaign against Violent Terrorism" launched by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2014, was justified by security concerns following attacks by Uyghur separatist groups. The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) – an umbrella organisation founded by militant Uyghurs – carried out sporadic attacks in Xinjiang and throughout China since the early 2000s, driven by forced use of Mandarin, limitations in religious practices, and increasing economic inequality (Potter, 2013). The Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP), a prominent ETIM faction, perpetrated notorious offences between 2013 and 2014, advocating for Xinjiang’s independence. Notably, in October 2013, a vehicle attack in Tiananmen Square killed five people and injured dozens, followed by similar aggressions in 2014 in Ürümqi and Yunnan province. In response, China accelerated its “Strike Hard” securitisation campaign against the so-called ‘Three Evils’: separatism, extremism and terrorism (Finley, 2019).

With rhetoric of deradicalisation of Xinjiang in place, the CCP has implemented efforts to eradicate Uyghur and minority culture through mass confinement, surveillance, and cultural destruction. What the state has defined as ‘vocational education and training centres’ – widely recognised as internment camps - represent one of the pillars of the repressive system (Roberts, 2020). A  sophisticated surveillance state monitors the population using advanced technology (Hiskes, 2018), while the regime has actively demolished and damaged the Islamic heritage of the region (Harris, 2020). Furthermore, among the mechanisms used to undermine minority identity, the state has developed a multifaceted system that, through various forms of pressure and control, appears to effectively coerce work (Lim, 2024).

XUAR’s forced labour system

Since 2019, researchers have documented two major complementary systems of forced labour targeting Uyghurs and other minorities in Xinjiang. Firstly, within the re-education camps, the detainees receive coerced training and work placement. Secondly, through the implementation of China’s ‘Poverty Alleviation Through Labor Transfer’ policy, surplus labourers are coercively trained and transferred either to the secondary or tertiary sector, or to seasonal agricultural work (Zenz, 2020).

The strategy of coercion that the government uses to compel people to work is also revealed by the analysis of a wide range of testimonies, attesting to compulsory labour within internment camps, the threat of being imprisoned for refusing government-sponsored job transfers, regular visits by state agents to pressure people to be transferred, and a representation of labour as a requirement for ideological training or as necessary for poverty alleviation (Xinjiang Victims Database). Moreover, the parameters provided by the International Labor Organisation’s updated handbook (2024), which mentions ‘labour transfers’ targeting minorities, further support the classification of these practices as ‘forced labour’ in the Xinjiang region.

Another relevant actor within the described system is the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) – a corporate conglomerate, considered a ‘state within the state’ – which has come under increased scrutiny in recent years because involved in operating and supporting some of the internment re-education camps, in incentivising companies to operate in Xinjiang, and allegedly profit from forced labourers (Murphy et. al., 2022).

International trade: the UFLPA, EU Regulation, and their potential impact

As outlined above, the US has recently enlarged the Entity List under the Uyghur Forced Labour Prevention Act (UFLPA). This was enacted with the objective of strengthening an already-existing ban on goods made with the involvement of forced labour, improving transparency, and ending the use of coerced employment specifically in Xinjiang (UFLPA, 2021). The Act bases itself on the presumption that goods mined, produced or manufactured in Xinjiang, or from one of the companies in the Entity List, are linked to the employment of forced labour and, thus, must be prohibited from US importation. Among the newly blacklisted firms is Huafu Fashion Co. - a global textile giant - alongside other businesses playing key roles in the solar energy and mining industries, such as Donghai JA Solar Technology Co. and Zijin Mining Group Co.

In a similar vein, the EU adopted the Regulation on prohibiting products made with forced labour on the Union market in December 2024. The said regulation, which will fully apply from December 2027, prohibits the import and export of any product made with forced labour, following a trend in EU regulations intending to emphasise accountability across the supply chain of economic actors.

In response to grave human rights violations or political tensions, trade is often used to try to improve the violating country’s conditions through unilateral agreements (Schultz & Ball, 2007), with sanctions representing the measure that is most likely to be applied. The UFLPA aims to sanction the human rights violations against Uyghurs that occur in the production of goods in Xinjiang, however, are these types of import bans really effective?

Enforcement challenges

There is limited evidence on the effectiveness of import bans in terms of forced labour reduction in the long-term supply chain (Pietropaoli et al., 2021). Nonetheless, there are studies claiming that sanctions like the UFLPA can contribute to a decrease in human rights violations in a country (Baek, 2008), but still with a relatively low degree of success.

The effects of the UFLPA have a great potential to impact China as its products are everywhere in global supply chains, such as cotton, silica-based products used to make solar panels, or aluminium for cars, a good percentage of which comes from Xinjiang. Moreover, the UFLPA should prompt enhanced due diligence by American companies, which are asked to carefully assess their supply chain and ensure that no forced labour is involved (Cline, 2024).

"The effects of the UFLPA have a great potential to impact China as its products are everywhere in global supply chains, such as cotton, silica-based products used to make solar panels, or aluminium for cars, a good percentage of which comes from Xinjiang."

However, there are limits to the effectiveness of such measures. For example, Chinese companies may effectively bypass UFLPA scrutiny by using the de minimis exception - principle that allows shipments below a certain value to face fewer regulatory controls. This permits businesses to avoid scrutiny even if their goods are produced using forced labour, as long as the shipment falls under the established value limit. Or, China could elude the import ban by shipping its goods from Xinjiang to third countries, which, in turn, will send them to the US.

Conclusion

The forced labour system that targets Uyghurs and other minorities in the region of Xinjiang has shown to be integrated into China’s broader policies of securitisation, surveillance, and cultural repression, under the pretext of poverty alleviation and counter-terrorism.

International concerns about the human rights conditions of these minorities in XUAR, led to relevant legislative actions. Mainly the UFLPA in the US, but also the EU Forced Labour Regulation, are examples of efforts aimed at countering the use of forced labour in global supply chains. However, despite the objective of pushing China to comply with international human rights and work standards, the effectiveness of trade restrictions remains uncertain, since Chinese companies may find ways to bypass the import bans.

"Despite the objective of pushing China to comply with international human rights and work standards, the effectiveness of trade restrictions remains uncertain, since Chinese companies may find ways to bypass the import bans."

In order to ensure meaningful steps forward in the fight against forced labour in Xinjiang, uninterrupted monitoring of the human rights conditions in the region will be required, together with stronger corporate accountability and broader international action, with more countries adopting measures like the American UFLPA.

Given the relatively recent implementation of the UFLPA — whose Entity List is updated on an ongoing basis — and the fact that the EU Forced Labour Regulation is still to be enforced, further research will be needed to evaluate the impact of these policies and determine their real effectiveness in bringing significant change.

This article represents the views of contributors to STEAR's online digital publication, and not those of STEAR, which takes no institutional positions.

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