Introduction
The conflict between Moldova and the separatist region of Transnistria, one of several persisting “frozen” conflicts in the post-Soviet sphere, has been lingering since the late stages of the Soviet Union. Despite numerous mediation attempts under involvement of great powers such as Russia and the US, the two sides have been unable to find a compromise. As such, Transnistria continues existing in an isolated state, relying heavily on Russian economic and military support to remain functional (Solovyov, 2025).
However, following decades of relative stability, the war in Ukraine has raised the stakes for the region, putting its severe political and economic reliance on Russia under pressure. The expiration of the latter’s gas transit agreement with Ukraine on 1 January 2025 has led to Transnistria being cut off from its sole supplier of energy, causing it to experience energy shortages and blackouts (Paholʹnickij, 2025). Despite the possibility of redirecting gas transit via the Trans-Balkan pipeline, Russia has so far refused to do so, citing an outstanding Moldovan gas debt that has long been a bone of contention between the two sides.
The current crisis can be seen as a decisive test for Russia’s practice of leveraging influence through the separatist entities it supports, as the fate of Transnistria may have an effect on the resolution of other frozen conflicts, like those in Georgia.
It may also turn into a litmus test for the EU to gauge the effectiveness of its measures to counter Russian influence in the region and induce structural change. This article will discuss what Russia’s objectives are in the current gas crisis and how it could affect Transnistria’s relations with Moldova.
Energy Crisis
After Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the continuation of transit of Russian natural gas through Ukrainian territory was one of the few issues on which both countries reached a common understanding. Ukraine intended to use the transit fees to finance the purchase of crucially important Western weapons systems, while Russia sought to fill its war chest with funds from its remaining Central and Eastern European customers and apply pressure on the EU. However, Ukraine had made it abundantly clear over the last few months that it did not intend to prolong the transit deal following its expiration at the end of 2024 (Peleschuk and Soldatkin, 2025).
Transnistria has been left hung out to dry as a result of its own isolation. The region’s complete reliance on Russian energy for its economy and budget have made it extremely vulnerable towards external shocks. And while Moldova has attempted – and to a significant degree, succeeded in – weaning off of its dependence on Russian energy sources after the outbreak of war, the country nonetheless relied on Transnistria for roughly 70-75% of its electricity needs, created by the Cuciurgan power station and purchased at vastly lower prices than on the European market (Solovyov, 2025).
Despite not coming as a surprise, the stoppage of gas flows left both entities unprepared. While Moldova resorted to buying gas at exorbitant prices on the European market, Transnistria was forced to shut down its industry and limit private gas consumption. Both also blamed the other side for causing the crisis: while Transnistrian and Russian officials pointed towards the outstanding gas debt and Ukraine’s unwillingness to continue transit, Moldovan President Maia Sandu accused Russia of artificially sowing the seeds of a humanitarian crisis by refusing to redirect gas flows via the Trans Balkan pipeline (Vypritzkich, 2025).
Given that Russia’s strategic goals of causing instability and undermining Moldova’s progress towards EU integration remain unchanged, its current approach of preventing the redirection of gas supplies to Transnistria seems odd at best, as it gives off the impression that it's abandoning a trusted ally. However, it is important to note that Russia continues to control the public narrative within the breakaway region: state media chime in with the Kremlin’s narrative that Chisinau not paying its debt and Kyiv refusing transit are to blame for the crisis at hand (First Pridnestrovian, 2025). As long as Russia can uphold this line of thinking among the population of Transnistria – a large chunk of which holds Russian and/or Moldovan citizenship – it can continue increasing pressure on the Moldovan government, using the threat of a severe humanitarian crisis as a bargaining chip.
At the same time, the loss of cheap electricity for Moldova, as well as its lack of preparation for the crisis, have left the ruling PAS party in a vulnerable position – mere months before crucial parliamentary elections that will heavily influence the country’s political course over the next several years. Rising energy costs for private consumers are likely to have a negative effect on the PAS party’s polling numbers, and potential coalition partners are few and far between, either due to ideological or personal reasons. In a deeply divided Moldovan society – President and PAS founder Maia Sandu merely won last year’s presidential elections thanks to diaspora support, losing the vote in Moldova proper (Całus, 2024) – this development may suffice to derail the ruling party’s attempts to hold on to power and push forward the country’s EU integration, especially given the opposition’s recent attempts to unify.
Forced to negotiate?
With its energy blackmail, Russia may be attempting to force the two conflicting sides to reopen negotiations on reunification. While this may seem illogical at first glance, it has the potential to kill several birds with one stone. Russia’s approach to the crisis in Moldova falls in line with the assertion of certain scholars that the country’s tendency to stir conflict in the near abroad is motivated mainly by its willingness to deter its neighbours from “[drifting] away from the emerging Russian-dominated security and economic zone” (Cameron and Orenstein, 2012). In this regard, Moldova’s (and especially President Maia Sandu’s) efforts to strive towards EU integration are a thorn in the Kremlin’s side. Given its geographically precarious situation, Transnistria has also traditionally been more open towards the EU, Ukraine and its parent state Moldova than other Russian-backed separatist republics (Kolstø, 2024), which may have led Russia to look for a “final solution” while it can still influence the process in a significant manner. Furthermore, Russia’s subsidization of Transnistria has become a logistical nightmare and costs the Kremlin money it could be putting towards its war effort in Ukraine. The Transnistrian regime’s relative neutrality vis-à-vis the Ukraine war (Foster, 2024), stemming from pragmatic considerations, may have also pushed the Kremlin to punish it by threatening its viability.
Reunification may actually increase the left bank’s influence on Moldovan politics: while many Transnistrians hold Moldovan citizenship, turnout for elections is usually very low due to political pressure and logistical hurdles. Reunification would add approximately 300.000 additional potential voters (Solovyov, 2025), many of whom are sceptical, if not outright opposed, to European integration (Douglas, 2025). Russia also hopes that an unexpected unification process under the current circumstances could burden Moldova with high financial costs, while also causing chaos and setting the stage for internal divisions.
The last promising attempt to unite the two territories - the Kozak referendum in 2003, named after Russian politician Dmitry Kozak - is still regarded as the Kremlin’s preferred blueprint for Moldovan unification (Solovyov, 2025). The memorandum foresaw the creation of an asymmetric federation in Moldova, granting significant legislative veto rights to the two autonomous regions, Transnistria and Gagauziya, while also ensuring the country's neutrality and keeping a Russian military presence to guarantee the plan's implementation. While it is highly unlikely that the Kremlin would be able to bring forward the same demands this time around, time may also be a factor in Russia's thought process, making any agreement with a certain degree of autonomy for Transnistria attractive. Moldova has made convincing strides towards EU accession over the past 4-5 years, and Cyprus’ example has shown that the EU doesn't necessarily rule out including members with unresolved territorial conflicts (albeit with a much less antagonistic adversary in Turkey). If, in the future, Moldova veered away from its goal of regaining territorial integrity in order to facilitate its integration into the EU, Transnistria would lose much of its value to Russia.
Conclusion
Russia's energy warfare against its own ally in Transnistria seems to have two distinct motivations, both with the goal of influencing Moldovan politics. First, Russia seeks to force both entities to revamp unification talks, hoping to increase Transnistria’s footprint within Moldovan domestic politics by ensuring the region's strong autonomous status within a Moldovan federal state. Given the Transnistrian populace’s fervent anti-EU sentiments, this has the potential of wreaking havoc on the country's current course and burdening it with high logistical costs. It also aims to punish Transnistria’s leadership for its divergent stance on the Ukraine war. Secondly, the Kremlin is attempting to rock the political boat in the run-up to this year's parliamentary elections, aiming to torpedo the ruling party PAS’ ratings by provoking the electorate’s ire through higher energy prices.
Despite seemingly being stuck between a rock and a hard place, Moldova and its allies have already succeeded in getting the Transnistrian regime to accept humanitarian aid amounting to roughly €20 million through an EU grant (European Commission, 2025).
Moldova and the EU should, within their capabilities, do their best to paint a clear picture of the situation among civil society and call out Russia for its energy blackmail and the fact that it is taking the Transnistrian population hostage.
This would not only help in alleviating distortions to the Moldovan electoral process caused by higher gas prices, but could also push Transnistrians to put more pressure on their government - and, by extension, Russia - to initiate a productive rapprochement with Moldova.
This article represents the views of contributors to STEAR's online digital publication,
and not those of STEAR, which takes no institutional positions.
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